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IAEC DG statement at the 48th General Conference of the IAEA

Mr. President,

I would like to join the other distinguished delegates in congratulating you on your election as the President of the 48th session of the IAEA General Conference. I am certain that under your professional guidance this session will be brought to a successful and harmonious conclusion. I wish to assure you the cooperation of the delegation of Israel in that endeavor.

On behalf of my delegation, I wish to commend the Secretariat and the Director General for their excellent preparatory efforts for this conference and to congratulate the Republic of Chad, the Islamic Republic of Mauritania and the Togolese Republic that have recently joined the IAEA and welcome them to the Agency.

Mr. President,
Facing the challenges and dangerous revelations in recent years, the IAEA should retain its vital role by strengthening its capabilities for safeguarding nuclear materials and facilities. Israel expresses its appreciation for the Agency's initiatives addressing the threats of proliferation and terrorism by enhancing the safety and security of nuclear materials and radioactive sources. Israel too is striving to contribute, however modestly, to these noble aims:

Israel has expressed its support for the Nuclear Security Fund by making a further voluntary contribution coming on top of our past contribution and a donation in-kind;
We are in the process of implementing the IAEA's Code of Conduct regarding the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, following its adoption in 2003;
Israel ratified the CPPNM in 2002 and has actively participated in the group of experts that prepared a draft amendment to the Convention.

Mr. President,
Two other essential components of the evolving global safety and security regime are the GTRI and the NSG.

I would like first to express our deep appreciation for the US initiative and resolve, together with the Russian Federation Government and the Agency's efforts, in launching the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, and offer our full support and cooperation.

Secondly, I take special pleasure in informing Member States of a new Israeli export control order that entered into force on July 2004. It fully incorporates the NSG Trigger List and the List of Nuclear-Related Dual Use Equipment, Materials, Software and Related Technology. The Israeli legislation goes beyond NSG lists and includes a "catch-all" clause.

Mr. President,
I also wish to express Israel's support for the U.S. proposal that Member States not participate in decisions by the Board regarding their own cases should they come under investigation for non-technical nonproliferation and safeguards violations.

Mr. President,
All these initiatives are important but still insufficient in view of the most acute challenges confronted now by the nonproliferation regime.

The attempts to develop nuclear weapons by certain states signatories to the NPT;
The growing availability of nuclear technologies and materials, mainly through illicit supply networks;
The increasing interest of non-state actors in WMD and in radiological weapons; and
The policy of certain regimes that combines seeking WMD capabilities, in violation of their international commitments, and supporting terrorism.

Against this background, it is not surprising the DG has indicated that it is time to begin designing a framework more suited to the threats and realities of the 21st century.

All four fundamental stages of the Safeguards process - detection, reporting, judgment and enforcement - are wanting.

The first stage, detection of non compliance, while vastly improved under the Additional Protocol (where applicable) still requires much bolstering, especially regarding two fundamental aspects:

Detection by the Agency of undeclared activities will always be critically dependant on intelligence provided by States. This is even more critical in the presence of illicit trafficking networks, which generally diminish intelligence signature because of smaller requirements for industrial infrastructure and trained cadres.
Much also depends on the adoption by the Agency of a "no-trust" and problem oriented culture, to effectively focus on inconsistencies under adverse conditions.

Mr. President,
The second stage of the safeguards process concerns reporting findings relevant to non compliance as well as lack of cooperation. Also, the Agency's reports should appropriately reflect the fact that IAEA safeguards cover only part of the obligations under the NPT.

The formidable political difficulties involved with the last two stages - judgment and enforcement. - have been amply demonstrated in recent BOG meetings.

These problems assume even greater significance when considering Member States' right to withdraw from the NPT on a relatively short notice while retaining its fuel cycle capabilities acquired under the treaty.

Mr. President,
All these lead to the inescapable conclusion that the traditional nuclear non proliferation tools, while remaining relevant and indispensable, are increasingly insufficient and inadequate to address the new challenges. New and enhanced tools are required.
It is now widely acknowledged that the combination of global warming and enhanced safety and reliability of nuclear power make it the most attractive source of energy for the future. Yet, for this vision to be realized a new synergy must be developed between safe, reliable nuclear power generation, overcoming proliferation concerns and environmentally sound waste disposal requirements. The expected massive expansion and global dissemination of nuclear infrastructure to meet growing energy demands makes this challenge especially pressing.

Special importance in this context must be assigned to establishing new norms aimed at diminishing proliferation risks involved with nuclear fuel cycle facilities. It is incumbent upon us to discuss this issue with an open mind. Some have suggested new fuel cycle norms, designed to create better tools for facing proliferation crisis once they occur. Other approaches seek to avoid the emergence of such problems by limiting the spread of fuel cycle facilities.

Mr. President,
Israel supports the U.S. initiative in this domain and commends the G-8 decision on a moratorium on the dissemination of fuel cycle facilities pending the formulation of a new norm.

A possible additional measure, parallel to the moratorium, addresses nuclear power reactors supply. This measure could facilitate access to such reactors, while internationally guaranteeing fuel supply by recognized existing vendors. In return, buyers of the power reactors would be demanded not to develop nuclear fuel-cycle capabilities and to return all spent fuel to their vendors. This arrangement could free countries from the economic burden of building and managing national nuclear fuel-cycle facilities, and the environmental burden of spent fuel storage. At the same time, it would allow for safer and more secure management of these sensitive facilities, thereby ensuring that proliferation risk would not increase with growing number of nuclear power reactors.

In this context, we also commend the DG's decision to convene an expert group to explore multilateral approaches to limit the global spread of fuel cycle facilities while providing assurances for competitively priced fuel supply. I hope that the group will identify and better define possible options for such arrangements concerning the front and back ends of the fuel cycle.

Mr. President,
I thus call on all Member States to focus their efforts on developing new tools that may enable the IAEA and others institutions to confront the new proliferation challenges while meeting the growing energy demands, instead of spending time and resources on irrelevant issues. A case in point, Mr. President, is in front of us in the form of draft resolutions pertaining to the Middle East. These have little value and stand out as extraneous to the IAEA Statute and missions.

Agenda item no. 19 calls for the establishment of the Middle East as a NWFZ. Israel's position in this regard is well known. We support the principle of establishing the Middle East as a zone free of all kinds of WMD as well as ballistic missiles. We believe that such a zone should be pursued once the political and security conditions necessary for its negotiation ripen. This unfortunately is hardly the present case, as some regional states still do not recognize Israel's very right to exist and even call for its elimination, while supporting terrorists groups' operations and ideologies. Moreover, Israel cannot ignore the alarming attitude of some regional states to their international commitments in the nuclear domain as reflected in recent Agency's findings.

Israel has made no secret its fundamental reservations to the language and present relevance of last year resolution, and has formally distanced itself from its modalities. However, consistent with its vision Israel has been willing to join the consensus on the resolution despite its deficiencies, still recognizing that there is no substitute to reconciliation, leading to direct negotiations and freely reached agreements among the States of the region.

Mr. President,
During the recent DG's visit to Israel, we have discussed the Agency's agenda for a forum in accordance with the GC 2000 Presidential Statement (GC(45)/DEC/12). This was done in the spirit of cooperation, which is also the basis for consensus on Agenda item no. 19. Israel cannot realistically be expected to sustain this approach unless its cooperative spirit reciprocated by other regional parties.

This holds especially for Agenda Item 20, the so-called "Israeli Nuclear Capabilities and Threat". Many alarming proliferation developments in the Middle East have occurred in recent years. None of these involve Israel, though many directly challenge our security. We thus see no basis for this draft resolution. It is cynically using this Conference for political purposes, similar to the same states' reservation against Israel's credentials. Both actions are politically motivated and have little to do with the IAEA objectives or mandate. This casts serious doubt on the sincerity of its sponsors and their willingness to make any real progress towards cooperative security in the Middle East. I thus call upon all Member States to reject such a proposal outright.

Israel will not be in a position to support Agenda Item 19 on "Application of IAEA Safeguards in the Middle East" if any action is taken on Agenda Item 20.

Mr. President,
Before closing, I would like to commend the IAEA for its contribution to cancer radiotherapy through the Technical Cooperation program. Israel supports the DG for launching the PACT, with the aim of addressing the alarming cancer rates in developing countries. As a country that has benefited from the TC program in this area, Israel would like now to share with others its knowledge and experience in radiotherapy. Toward this end, Israel stands ready to provide interested parties with practical training in radiotherapy, radiation techniques, quality assurance and dosimetry at leading Israeli medical centers.

Finally, Mr. President, I am privilege and very happy to announce the donation of an artwork by Ya'acov Agam to the Agency by the Government of Israel. This original artwork created by the internationally renown Israeli artist is entitled "From Darkness to Light". The image is a celebration of colors, motion and shapes that symbolizes the renewed hope in nuclear energy and its potential contribution to the promotion of peace and development. I invite you all to attend the unveiling ceremony in the presence of the artist, scheduled for tomorrow at 13:00 at the Austria Center's entrance hall.

Thank you, Mr. President.